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In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one
of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and
returns it to Bob. Bob then measures the backward qubits to learn about Alice’s operations and hence the key
bits. Recently, we proved the unconditional security of the final key of this protocol in the ideal device setting.
In this paper, we prove that two-way DQKD protocols are immune to all detector-side-channel attacks at Bob’s
side, while we assume ideal detectors at Alice’s side for error testing. Our result represents a step forward in
making DQKD protocols secure against general detector-side-channel attacks.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.044302 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, also called quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), allows two remote parties, usually called Alice
and Bob, to establish a secret key that can be used to transmit
a secret message with a classical one-time pad scheme. After
the pioneering work presented by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 (BB84), the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol
was proven with the assumption of ideal settings [1–4]. In
practice, the devices of QKD are imperfect, the eavesdropper,
called Eve, can exploit the imperfections of the devices to gain
partial or full information about the key bits [5,6]. It has been
shown that Eve may take advantage of the nonzero multiphoton
emission probability of Alice’s laser source and the loss of
quantum channel, by using the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack [7–10]. Decoy state QKD has been proposed to beat
Eve’s PNS attacks, which can substantially increase the secure
key distribution distance [11–13].
An important part of the QKD system is the measurement
devices. In experiments, the detection efficiency of the practi-
cal single-photon detectors (SPDs) is low and, in most cases,
the two detectors are asymmetric, which may be exploited by
Eve to steal information on the final key. For example, attacks
that exploit the efficiency mismatch between two SPDs in the
QKD system have been proposed, demonstrated, and analyzed;
they include the time-shift attack [14–16] and the faked states
attack [17]. Also, it has been demonstrated experimentally
that Eve can tracelessly acquire the full secret key bits
using specially tailored bright illumination [18]. Recently, a
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD scheme was
proposed to remove detector-side-channel attacks [19]. The
advantage is that security can be guaranteed without regard to
the experimental details of the measurement device. In this
scheme, Alice and Bob send signal pulses to a Bell-state
measurement device which may be owned by Eve and it is
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proven that they can distill some secure key bits based on the
Bell measurement results.
Recently, the security of four-state deterministic quantum
key distribution (DQKD) with a two-way quantum channel
against the most general attacks has been proven by us [20,21]
under the ideal-device setting, while it is widely believed that
two-way DQKD is vulnerable under Eve’s practical attacks
because Eve can attack the travel photon in both forward and
backward lines. In this paper, we prove that two variations of
the DQKD protocol are immune to all detector-side-channel
attacks on Bob’s side in the backward line. We do not analyze
the MDI security of Alice’s detectors and assume that they are
ideal and nonblinded.
II. SECURITY OF THE FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL
In most QKD protocols, after distributing all signal qubits,
Alice and Bob should communicate through public channel for
basis reconciliation. In the BB84 protocol, about half of Bob’s
measurement results are discarded due to the inconsistent
bases Alice and Bob used.1 But, in two-way DQKD protocols
[23–28], Bob can decode Alice’s key bits after measuring
the returned qubits directly, without basis reconciliation. This
means that all measurement results will be used for key
distillation.2 The two-way DQKD was first proposed by
using entanglement [23]. Later, a single-photon two-state
protocol [26] was proposed for improving the experimental
performance and then a single-photon four-state protocol
was proposed independently in Refs. [27,28]. After that,
the security of the two-way DQKD against some special
attacks was studied [24,29]. Recently, the security of the
four-state protocol against the most general attacks under the
ideal-device setting was proved by us [20,21].
Let us start with a brief review of the four-state two-way
DQKD protocol with two encoding operations [see Fig. 1(a)].
1In the efficient BB84 protocol [22], the fraction of the measurement
results to be discarded goes to zero asymptotically.
2This is true for any number of signals for the two-way protocol,
not just asymptotically.
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FIG. 1. We prove that the four-state DQKD protocols with two
encoding operations (a) and four encoding operations (b) are MDI
secure in line A-to-B. Protocol (b) was shown to be equivalent to
protocol (c) where the forward channel runs the BB84 protocol and
the backward channel runs a classical one-time pad (OTP) [21]. Here,
a, a1, and a2 represent a raw secret key bit in all three protocols
randomly chosen by Alice. In protocol (b), either a1 or a2 will be
used as the key bit depending on the basis chosen by Bob which he
will inform Alice of after his measurement. Here, |bw〉 represents
eigenstate b of basis w and Mw represents a measurement in basis w.
(1) Bob prepares n qubits randomly in one of the four states,
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉, where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)√2, and sends
them to Alice. (2) Alice randomly switches the communication
to the check mode or the encoding mode. (3) In the check
mode, Alice randomly measures part of the received states in
the X basis or the Z basis. (4) In the encoding mode, Alice
randomly performs the unitary operation I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|
to encode bit 0 or Y = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| to encode bit 1.
(5) Alice sends the encoded qubits back to Bob. Since Alice’s
encoding operations do not change the bases of Bob’s states,
i.e., Y {|0〉,|1〉} = {−|1〉,|0〉} and Y {|+〉,|−〉} = {|−〉, − |+〉},
Bob measures each qubit in the same basis as the one he used
for preparation to get Alice’s key bit deterministically, without
basis reconciliation. (6) After Bob measures all returned
qubits, Alice announces her measurement results in the check
mode to compute the fidelity of the forward states in the
B-to-A channel for the consistent-basis measurements. They
can get the fidelity f0, f1, f+, and f− of |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and
|−〉, respectively. (7) Alice announces part of her key bits
in the encoding mode to compute the error-rate e in the
A-to-B channel. (8) Alice and Bob perform error-correction
(EC) and privacy amplification (PA) to generate the final
key bits. In the asymptotic scenario, after verifying ξ ≡
(f0 + f1 + f+ + f−)/2 − 1  1/2, Alice and Bob can get the
secure final key against general attacks with the generation
rate
r = 1 − h(ξ ) − h(e), (1)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary
entropy function, and h(ξ ) and h(e) are the amounts of the key
bits Alice and Bob should sacrifice for EC and PA.
With the idea of delaying PA, the security of a two-way
DQKD protocol that uses four states and four encoding
operations was proven [21] [see Fig. 1(b)]. It has been shown
that the idea of delaying PA can simplify the security proof
of two-way DQKD protocols, with the same key generation
rate as that derived in Ref. [20]. The security of a two-way
DQKD can also be proved against most general attacks with the
entropic uncertainty relation, and a higher final key generation
rate may be achieved [30].
III. SECURITY OF THE FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL
AGAINST ALL DETECTOR-SIDE-CHANNEL
ATTACKS IN LINE A-TO-B
We prove in this section the MDI security of line A-to-B for
the original four-state protocol with two encoding operations
proposed in Refs. [27,28], and the four-state protocol with four
encoding operations proposed in Ref. [21]. Our proof relies on
the use of equivalent protocols.
A. Proof of MDI security of the four-state protocol
with two encoding operations
In order to prove the security of the MDI version of the
protocol in line A-to-B, we modify the protocol by moving
Bob’s measurement to the hands of Eve in line A-to-B. The
modified protocol is the same as the original protocol in Sec. II
except with step (5) replaced as follows: (5) Alice sends the
encoded qubit to Eve. Bob tells Eve the measurement basis.
Eve makes a measurement on Alice’s qubit using Bob’s basis
and returns the measurement result to Bob.
Note that Bob tells Eve the basis only after Alice has
received the qubit on line B-to-A. This ensures that Eve cannot
determine the initial qubit Bob sent out. Intuitively, we can
understand the security of the modified protocol as follows.
Since Bob randomly prepares the signal qubit in one of the four
states, Eve cannot know Alice’s encoding operations even if
she gets Bob’s measurement result. To know Alice’s encoding,
Eve has to know Bob’s initial state as well.
To prove the security of the modified protocol rigorously,
we consider the PA term in the key rate formula. The secure
key rate rPA from PA for the secret key generation is given
by Renner and Ko¨nig’s result [31]: rPA = S(ρA|ρBE,basis) =
S(ρABE |basis) − S(ρBE |basis), whereρABE is the overall state
of Alice’s encoding (A), the qubit emitted to line B-to-A
(B), and Eve’s ancillas (E), and ρBE = trA(ρABE). Note that
system B is released by Bob, encoded by Alice, and returned
to Eve. This PA formula reflects that Eve, in order to learn
about the key bit, uses the entire qubit from Alice and her
own ancillas, which include those used in her attack on line
B-to-A. This is consistent with the modified protocol where
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TABLE I. Key bit value dependence on the basis used by Bob (x
or z) and Alice’s encoding operation (I , X, Y , or Z). For instance,
when Bob uses basis x, bit 1 is encoded by Alice if she applies Z or
Y on the qubit emitted by Bob.
Bit value
Basis 0 1
x {I,X} {Z,Y }
z {I,Z} {X,Y }
Eve measures ρBE . We now show that ρABE|basis = ρABE ; i.e.,
the overall state is not changed due to the knowledge of the
basis.
Bob initially prepares the qubit ρB in one of the four states.
When the basis is z or x, Bob prepares ρB|z = 12 |0〉〈0| +
1
2 |1〉〈1| or ρB|x = 12 |+〉〈+| + 12 |−〉〈−|, respectively. Since
ρB|z = ρB|x = I/2, further evolution of this state will be
independent of the basis. Thus,
ρABE|basis = ρABE. (2)
For completeness, we describe ρABE in more detailed as
follows. Eve’s most general attack on the B-to-A channel
can be described as a joint unitary operation together with
ancillas. After Eve’s attack on the B-to-A channel, the
joint state of the forward qubit and Eve’s ancilla becomes
ρBEB→A = UBE(ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|)UBE , where |E〉 is the initial state
of Eve’s ancilla. After Alice’s encoding operations, the joint
state of backward qubit and Eve’s ancilla becomes ρABE =
1
2 |0〉〈0|A ⊗ ρBE0 + 12 |1〉〈1|A ⊗ ρBE1 , where ρBE0 = ρBEB→A and
ρBE1 = YBρBEB→AYB .
Therefore, Eq. (2) reduces rPA to rPA = S(ρABE) − S(ρBE)
for the modified protocol; and also ρABE in the modified
protocol is the same as in the original protocol because ρB
undergoes the same evolution in both protocols. Therefore, we
can directly apply the calculation of rPA of the original protocol
and its result to the modified protocol here. In summary, the
modified protocol has the same key rate formula, Eq. (1). The
four-state protocol is secure independent of the measurement
and is immune against all detector-side-channel attacks in line
A-to-B.
B. Proof of MDI security of the four-state protocol
with four encoding operations
Here, we also show the MDI security in line A-to-B of the
four-state protocol with four encoding operations of Ref. [21]
[see Fig. 1(b)]. In this protocol, the steps are the same as the
protocol given in Sec. II except with steps (4) and (5) replaced
as follows: (4) In the encoding mode, Alice randomly performs
unitary operations I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|, X = |1〉〈0| + |0〉〈1|,
Z = |−〉〈+| + |+〉〈−|, or Y = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. The actual key
bit value is dependent on the basis used (Table I). (5) Alice
sends the encoded qubits back to Bob. Bob measures each
qubit in the same basis as the one he used for preparation to get
Alice’s key bit deterministically, without basis reconciliation.
Bob also tells Alice his basis choice so that she knows the key
bit value according to Table I.
We show that this protocol is MDI secure in line A-to-B.
The security proof of this protocol given in Ref. [21] reduces
the protocol to an equivalent protocol where the forward
channel B-to-A runs the BB84 protocol and the backward
channel A-to-B runs a classical one-time pad (OTP) (see
Fig. 1(c) and Fig. 3 of Ref. [21]). It is argued in Ref. [21]
that the classical OTP is equivalent to a quantum OTP by
encoding classical states onto quantum states in some basis.
The basis used has no bearing on the security since the security
originates from that of the classical OTP: Eve is allowed to
know the OTP-encrypted bit value in transit on line A-to-B. It
is argued further in Ref. [21] that this basis is the basis used
by Bob for his initial state. Thus, it is irrelevant whether Bob
announces the basis before or after the OTP operation on line
A-to-B. Using the same modification in Sec. III A for moving
the measurement device from Bob to Eve, this variant of the
four-state protocol is MDI secure in line A-to-B.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although the two-way DQKD has higher resistance to PNS
attack-like attacks [32], decoy states are necessary to modify
the four-state protocol for long-distance key distribution [33].
Another problem is that the two-way QKD is vulnerable to
Eve’s Trojan horse attacks, such as the invisible photon attack
[29]. In practice, Alice can add a filter to defeat Eve’s invisible
photon attack. All Bob’s photon pulses should pass through
Alice’s filter first and only wavelengths close to the operating
wavelength are allowed to pass through.
It has been widely believed that, since Eve can attack
the travel photons both in line B-to-A and in line A-to-B,
QKD with a two-way quantum channel is more vulnerable
under Eve’s practical attacks compared with a one-way QKD
protocol, such as the BB84 protocol. In this paper, we have
shown that two four-state protocols are MDI secure in line
A-to-B; i.e., when Eve instead of Bob measures Alice’s qubit
using Bob’s basis, the modified protocols have the same
key generation rate as that of the original protocols. Since
line A-to-B is MDI secure, measurement-device-dependent
attacks may only work in line B-to-A. Finally, we want
to emphasize that we only proved the security of two-way
DQKD against detector-side-channel attacks on Bob’s side
in the backward line A-to-B, while the MDI security of
Alice’s detectors in the check mode should be studied in future
work.
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